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New Federalism 
Introduction 
Theodore W. Ruger∗ 
One of the already evident legacies of the current Supreme Court 
is its imposition, or reimposition, of several judicially enforceable 
restraints on national government authority. In the past decade the 
Court has propounded a “new federalism” primarily through a limited 
cluster of related doctrines—arising from the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause,1 the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,2 and 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment3—in which it has found 
and applied meaningful limits on Congressional power. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has described the Court’s project in these cases as 
delineating, and then policing, the “distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local.”4  
This federalism turn has been well-noticed and amply critiqued by 
the legal academy, as the Court’s opinions have spurred continued 
debate over the proper contours of state and federal sovereignty. The 
debate has been vigorous, and it has been voluminous: since Gregory 
v. Ashcroft5 in 1991 signaled the coming federalism revival, almost 
1000 academic law journal articles have appeared with the word 
“federalism” in their titles6 (and many more have addressed the 
subject without such titular reference).  
 ∗ Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 2. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Tenth Amendment); New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (same); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (2001) (Eleventh 
Amendment).  
 3. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 502 (1997). 
 4. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68. 
 5. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 6. This figure was derived from a Westlaw search on July 21, 2004, in the “Journals and 
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For all of this existing discourse, several political and legal 
developments in the past two or three years have reinvigorated the 
debate about federalism in ways that complicate and may even invert 
opinions about the proper allocation of federal and state authority 
among those in the academy, on the bench, and in broader civic 
society. First, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 
national response to those actions have significantly altered the terms 
of the federalism debate. In terms of domestic security policy, the 
push toward integration of federal, state and local law enforcement 
functions has done much to undermine the United States v. Lopez 
Court’s assertion that it is possible (and normatively desirable) to 
identify and segregate distinct zones of local and national authority. 
The Justices themselves are not immune from such influences, and it 
is difficult, for instance, to imagine that this Supreme Court would, in 
a case of first impression, issue an opinion like that of Printz v. 
United States7 today. In Printz, a 1997 case, the Court held that even 
a minimal, and temporary, mandate requiring state law-enforcement 
officials to assist in conducting background checks prior to gun sales 
constituted unconstitutional “conscripti[on]” by Congress,8 a 
formalism that is far removed from the more pragmatic, integrated 
norms of post-9/11 law enforcement.  
A second notable development in the most recent few years has 
been the Supreme Court’s own willingness to halt the momentum of 
its federalism jurisprudence. In Nevada v. Hibbs,9 a six-Justice 
majority brushed aside Nevada’s sovereign-immunity defense to hold 
that Congress could authorize individuals to sue states to enforce the 
Family and Medical Leave Act.10 In a major decision in June 2004, 
the Court held that a federal statute (ERISA) preempted state tort 
lawsuits against managed care organizations, thus assuring that a 
major component of health law and policy was divested from state 
control and left with Congress and the federal courts.11 To be sure, 
Law Reviews” database, search term “ti(federalism)”. 
 7. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 8. Id. at 935. 
 9. 123 S. Ct. 1972, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (holding that ERISA 
preempts state law statutes authorizing suits against managed care organizations for negligence 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/7
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the Court has not undone any of its major federalism decisions of the 
past decade, but it appears to have decided that the federalism turn 
had gone far enough.  
The final shift in the federalism debate—and the one perhaps most 
interesting for future academic and judicial discourse—is the 
significant recent variation in the kinds of state policy choices that are 
alleged to be beyond congressional reach. For decades, even back 
into the nineteenth century, assertions of state sovereignty have often 
been associated with “conservative” substantive politics, while 
advocates of broad national power have characteristically been more 
“liberal” (the labels are crude but generally accurate in this context). 
National power was the force behind emancipation, 
antidiscrimination laws, wages-and-hours legislation, and various 
other progressive remedial statutes. The hue and cry of “states’ 
rights” was frequently invoked in the name of protecting regimes of 
slavery, segregation, child labor and underenforcement of domestic 
violence laws. So pervasive is this standard ideological valence in the 
substantive policies underlying the federalism debates that some 
academics have considered the question of whether concern for state 
sovereignty is itself a choice laden with particular substantive 
values.12 The composition of the Supreme Court’s controlling 
majority—five moderate-to-conservative, Republican-appointed 
judges13—in most of its key federalism rulings only serves to confirm 
this traditional association of conservatism with concern for state 
sovereignty.  
This traditional ideological gloss on the federalism question 
makes several recent developments more interesting. As Congress 
and the White House become more conservative since 2000, the 
conventional arguments for limited federal authority and 
decentralized state-by-state decisionmaking have been invoked in 
service of a new range of policies typically associated with “liberal” 
in benefit provision). 
 12. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of 
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, 133–62 (2002). 
 13. On studies of the ideological array of the current nine Justices, see generally Theodore 
W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court 
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1157–59 (2004). 
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politics. Most notable in this respect is the ongoing debate over same-
sex marriage, where arguments for individual states’ freedom to 
define marriage in accord with local norms predominate the 
opposition to federal proposals to define marriage as exclusively 
heterosexual.14 States have taken the lead in regulating such pressing 
health policy areas as prescription drug pricing and managed care, 
and advocates for patients’ rights have urged greater state regulatory 
autonomy against claims of statutory or Dormant Commerce Clause 
preemption.15 The Supreme Court has agreed to review a case next 
Term that asks whether medical marijuana grown solely for 
medicinal use (not for sale) is beyond the federal Commerce Clause 
regulatory power.16 The character of these new substantive claims 
have invigorated the traditional federalism debates, and may lead 
some academics—and perhaps even some Justices—to modify the 
positions taken in years past.  
Taken together, all of these developments over the past three years 
illustrate that there remain many open questions regarding the proper 
scope of federal and state authority. This symposium reflects the 
vitality of that ongoing debate, as participants draw on various 
perspectives to address a diverse array of issues.  
Erwin Chemerinsky’s essay takes note of one of the recent 
developments described above—the Court’s apparent braking of its 
push toward limited federal power in the 2003 Nevada v. Hibbs17 
decision. In Hibbs, the Court surprised many observers by holding 
that Congress could, consistent with its powers under Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, make states amenable to suits brought by 
individual citizens in federal courts. Chemerinsky applauds the 
Court’s result in Hibbs, but illuminates various problematic features 
of its reasoning in that case and in related cases. The Court has 
 14. For an early exponent of this position, see Jonathan Rauch, Editorial, Give Federalism 
a Chance: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 2, 2001, at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-rauch080201.shtml. 
 15. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 538 U.S. 644 
(2003) (Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to state drug pricing plan); Kentucky Ass’n of 
Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (ERISA preemption challenge to 
state “any willing provider” law applied to HMOs). 
 16. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 
(2004). 
 17. 123 S. Ct. 1972, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/7
p 89 Ruger book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Introduction 93 
 
 
 
permitted Congress remedial authority over some kinds of 
discrimination but not others, and in Chemerinsky’s view has not 
adequately justified its categorical distinctions. In addition to its 
skillful substantive critique of the Court’s doctrinal framework, the 
essay reminds us that federalism cases, although nominally about 
vertical (federal-state) allocation of authority, also present a 
horizontal separation-of-powers question: which entity, the Court or 
Congress, is the proper arbiter of the boundaries of federal power? 
Despite support in the academy and among some dissenting Justices 
for a deferential attitude toward congressional choices in this area,18 
the majority of the Court has cast itself as the ultimate authority on 
the federal-state allocation of power, and nothing in Hibbs suggests 
any change in this position.  
Such judicial supremacy does not exist in the subconstitutional 
context of statutory interpretation, where Congress is free to revise, 
or outright overrule, the Supreme Court’s construction of a statute. 
But as David Schwartz’s symposium essay underscores, such 
statutory decisions can have a profound impact on the federal-state 
balance of power. A vast amount of individual and commercial 
behavior in the United States is concurrently regulated by both states 
and the federal government. A federal statute that preempts related 
state regulation effectively strips the state of a component of its 
active sovereignty as applied to that field. And although the decision 
to preempt by statute is formally vested in Congress, many federal 
laws contain preemption clauses that are vague and contradictory, 
such that federal courts have great interpretive latitude in deciding the 
preemptive effect of a national regulatory scheme. With particular 
focus on the Federal Arbitration Act, Schwartz assesses this 
subconstitutional dimension of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, 
and finds—as others have19—that this Court and other federal courts 
have been significantly less solicitous of state sovereignty in 
preemption cases than in more prominent constitutional decisions. In 
 18. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616–20 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 19. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & Kevin Scott, Dissing States? Invalidation of State Action 
During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301, 1343-45 (2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 S. CT. REV. 343, 367-72.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Schwartz’s account, it falls to state judges to more robustly protect 
state regulatory autonomy when questions of preemption arise.  
Both Professor Chemerinsky and Professor Schwartz critique the 
choices the Justices have made in specific federalism cases. Central 
to such normative critique is the idea that the Justices, in those cases 
and others, possessed meaningful interpretive discretion to choose a 
different (and better) result. Occasionally defenders of the Court’s 
choices, even the Justices themselves, will point to a reading of the 
original choices the Constitution’s Framers made as requiring a 
certain judicial result. Such originalist claims, which deny 
meaningful contemporary discretion by judges, rest on two related 
propositions—first that there is a clear historical intent on the issue at 
hand, and second that if clear intent exists modern judges are obliged 
to follow it. Whatever one’s position on the second point, Conrad 
Weiler’s essay casts significant doubt on the former in the context of 
the federalism debate. In his detailed survey of Framing-era 
conceptions of such terms as “commerce,” and “economic” power, 
Weiler illustrates how contested and unclear historical attitudes on 
these questions were. And as Weiler’s account shows, to the extent 
any clear eighteenth-century consensus on these issues is discernable 
at all, the Court’s jurisprudence is untethered from those original 
assumptions.  
These first three contributions, and most discussion of federalism 
generally, relate in one way or another to the allocation of authority 
between two different sovereignties—state and federal governments. 
This is neither surprising nor inappropriate, as both the Court’s 
jurisprudence and the Constitution’s sparse textual commands speak 
of an allocation of authority between two different kinds of 
sovereignties. John Brigham’s paper reminds us, however, that 
federalism-style concerns are relevant even in the allocation of 
decisional power within a single unitary sovereignty spread over a 
large enough area. Stripped from the specificities of the American 
constitutional tradition, several of the most persuasive abstract 
justifications for federalism would support a degree of decentralized 
decision-making in the administration of national power. In a polity 
where preferences are heterogeneous and distributed in uneven 
geographic fashion, devolution of authority to smaller local units may 
increase overall policy satisfaction. Moreover, as famously noted by 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/7
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Justice Brandeis, disaggregation of regulatory authority permits 
small-scale policy experimentation and innovation at relatively low 
social cost. Both of these theoretical considerations apply full well in 
the dual sovereignty context, and are often invoked in support of state 
power, but their normative support for decentralized authority is not 
dependent on a dichotomous governmental structure.  
The benefits of decentralization have long been evident with 
respect to individual United States Attorney’s offices, which 
historically have had wide independent latitude to make their own 
investigation, charging, and sentencing decisions in most cases. 
Professor Brigham’s paper takes up this concern with respect to the 
ultimate prosecutorial decision—whether or not to seek the death 
penalty. As he notes, the coupling of a new federal death penalty with 
a centralized push for uniform application from the Department of 
Justice has resulted in a clash of norms. The federal death penalty is 
now being sought and applied even in regions of the country where 
local preferences—clearly expressed in state law and practice—are 
against the death penalty. His essay raises a number of interesting 
possibilities about how this clash of sovereignties might play out in 
the context of American federalism. 
Taken together, the contributions to this symposium demonstrate 
that several intriguing and difficult questions about the federal-state 
allocation of power remain open even as we apparently near the end 
of the particular Rehnquist Court’s federalism initiative. New Justices 
on the Court and new initiatives by federal and state elected officials 
in the future will reshape this debate in ways that are perhaps 
unexpected and currently unforeseen. That the essays here are 
topically and methodologically diverse exemplifies the variety of this 
ongoing debate, which promises to continue throughout the next 
decade and beyond.  
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